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MIGRATION, LOCAL POLITICS AND CAMPFIRE.
V. Dzingirai
Abstract
Over the years there has been, in Southern Africa, a steady flow o f populations from the 
overcrowded communal areas into those marginal zones which previously were sparsely 
populated. Usually it is post-independent leadership which encourages and facilitates 
settlement into these marginal areas currently occupied by minohty ethnic groups which 
have failed to secure political representation since independence. The influx o f people 
into these marginal areas affects the development o f existing programmes aimed at 
sustainable utilisation o f natural resources. This article shows how politicians in 
Zimbabwe facilitate the resettlement o f people into the previously sparsely populated 
Zambezi Valley. In addition, it shows that the huge influx o f people into the valley has 
tended to affect the development o f a community-based natural resource management 
project which was starting to benefit the Tonga people.
IT IS FREQUENTLY the case that post-independent leadership instigates, for 
political reasons, the movement or migration of thousands of rural people from the 
dominant ethnic groups at the centre of the state into the formerly frontier zones 
(Herbst, 1990, 70). In Zimbabwe, for example, perhaps as many as a million rural 
people have relocated from the overcrowded communal areas of southern and 
eastern Zimbabwe1 into the Zambezi Valley, Gokwe and Binga, which previously 
were sparsely populated. These areas were previously settled by a variety of small 
ethnic groups, mostly the Shangwe and Tonga people, who have failed to secure 
political representation since independence.
In recent years a new twist to this dynamic has emerged. CAMPFIRE 2 has started 
to generate considerable incomes for these formerly marginalised people from 
sustainable and other tourism - as much as $11,000,000 (Eleven million Zimbabwe 
dollars) between 1993-1994 (four districts with a population of 641,186 were 
involved in this income).3 Despite some teething difficulties and the long history of 
conflict between the state and these communities over wildlife, the indigenous^ - 
communities of northern Zimbabwe came to welcome and identify with CAMPFIRE 
as a major source of income and a boost to their self-governance.
1 An area which Beach (1994) has called the 'great crescent', in which the majority of Zimbabwe's 
people have lived for the last millennium.
2 The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources is a form of commercial 
partnership between safari operators and rural communities in wilderness zones.
3 Recent research has shown that Councils and Safari Operators want to monopolise the revenues 
from CAMPFIRE, leaving communities discontented with the Programme (Dzingirai, 1994).
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In recent articles, I have presented details of how migrants acquired land and 
how they embarked on economic strategies that were opposed to CAMPFIRE 
(Dzingirai, 1993: 167-175; Madzudzo & Dzingirai, 1995). In this article, I discuss 
how post-independent leadership encourages people from the dominant groups 
to settle in those marginal areas, already involved in wilderness management. I 
argue that community-based wilderness management, like any other rural 
development project, cannot succeed if it is seen by prominent countryside 
politicians to be opposing their interests.
The Case Study Area: Binga District
The semi-arid Binga district o f the Zambezi Valley is the focus of this study. Binga is 
historically mostly a wilderness area, with most of the local population of Tonga 
speakers resident along the Zambezi River and its tributaries until the construction 
of the Kariba Dam in the 1950s. Their riverine location was important for cultivation 
in an area with low rainfall. Even today nearly a third of the area is under state 
management as a national park and forest reserve, and it includes one of the 
country's largest parks, Chizarira. Due to low agro-ecological potential and the 
presence of tsetse fly, there was no allocation of land in Binga district to White 
colonial farmers.
Most of the population of Binga were forcibly resettled because of the Kariba Dam, 
and remain unable to sustain themselves through agriculture, due to the very limited 
riverine land in the interior, and the poor soils and low rainfall. Thus they eke out a 
living through combining gathering, fishing on the lake where and when government 
allows, and illegal hunting with what has become since independence almost 
continuous famine relief. In 1989, CAMPFIRE was introduced to he district, and by 
1992/3 was disbursing to the local population of 87,000 people as much as 
Z$837,000 (US$130 000) per year in cash dividends. It thus contributed to local 
livelihoods. In addition and of greater political importance, it provided the local 
council with a significant source of revenue with which to undertake expansion of 
services and other development activities.
The districts currently experience an influx of cattle owners and cash crop farmers 
from the neighbouring Lupane area. The immigrants speak the Ndebele language 
and claim to be of Ndebele ancestry. It is more accurate to regard these 
immigrants, as Ranger (1995) has done, as a mixture of both Ndebele and other 
small minority groups previously found in the area.
The district is divided into 21 administrative units called wards, each represented by 
an elected councillor. Together with the executive staff, the councillors make up the 
district council. All the councillors are Tonga. At the village level, village chairmen 
are the leaders. The offices of councillor and village chairmen are fairly recent 
institutions, created after independence. Before this, villages were led by village 
heads and chiefs assisted by an array of informal leaders. Traditional leadership is 
still powerful: chiefs and village heads still command respect from the people who 
sometimes give them gifts such as money, groceries and livestock. In practice, 
chiefs and village heads allocate land to the people (Dzingirai, 1994, 167-175), a 
function that legally belongs to the district council.
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Also active in the district are 'big men'. They include two parliamentarians (because 
the district is divided into two constituencies), the Matebeleland provincial governor, 
the district chairman of the ZANU (PF) political party, as well as the provincial 
administrator. People say these men, particularly the governor and the 
parliamentarians, interact with the president of the country, and that this is one 
reason why they are feared and respected. People also say that they fear and 
respect these big men because of their role in the liberation war.
With the exception of the district chairman, all the big politicians are located outside 
the district. The governor is based in the city of Bulawayo. The offices of the 
provincial administrator are located in Hwange. The parliamentarians oscillate 
between the district and the capital city of Harare. The provincial party chairman is 
resident in Lupane. Despite the fact that they are not resident in the district, these 
officials maintain regular contact with the people of the district.
There are two further significant characteristics of these politicians: they are 
members of the ruling ZANU (PF) party in good standing, and secondly, all claim to 
belong to the Ndebele ethnic group. Part of their support comes from the Ndebele 
immigrants whom they have encouraged to settle in Binga.
Politicians and Their Support for Immigrants
There are a number of reasons why these politicians, particularly those who are 
elected to office, actively encourage immigrants to settle in the Zambezi Valley and 
support them once they have settled. F\irst, the politicians want political support in 
the elections. They are aware that many people are without good land and that they 
cannot provide jobs for the people. Giving people land is one of the ways politicians 
secure the support of the electorate. In addition, it is one of the tangible ways they 
can prove themselves, in the eyes of the people, to be the true revolutionaries of the 
liberation war, in which land was a key issue (Shamuyarira, 1984; 8). Politicians also 
say they give land because as 'kinsmen' of the Ndebele people, they are traditionally 
expected to do so. One politician 4 remarked at a meeting: 'If I do not provide you 
with land where to build your home I would have failed my role as your father.'
To these big men, and politicians in general, land is as important as it is to the 
peasants. However, whereas peasants need land for survival, politicians see it as a 
strategic resource that forms the basis of their leadership. They can use the land to 
mobilise and remobilise the peasants to support them (Bratton, 1994: 80).
PoliticKiiiis' Activities in
Politicians do two related things. Firstly, they tell people to migrate and settle into 
Binga. Secondly, they support immigrants against any threat by the council to evict 
them. Politicians have generally tended to rely on misangano (rallies) to maintain 
their standing in the district. These are gatherings held at a rural venue. Normally
4 Owing to the sensitivity of the issues discussed in this article I have left the description of the 
politicians at a general level.
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they start with prayers and the chanting of slogans - such activities do not admit 
dissent and are no doubt used to prepare people to accept the message of the 
politicians (see also Mararike, 1993: 60; Dzingirai, 1992; Bloch, 1977: 278-291). 
Usually there are also dances and other forms of entertainment, such as singing by 
choirs. Almost always there is food, which is given to the people after the meeting. 
The act that the food is given after the meeting means that in order to enjoy the 
meal people must wait and listen to the political message even if they are not 
interested in it. The politicians themselves do not directly call people to attend the 
mass rallies, partly because they do not have the resources to do so. The practice 
is to approach the chiefs, who are well known people, obeyed and feared. If they 
call a meeting everybody must attend. Any person who does not attend is 
threatened with eviction from the land or with a fine. I heard from reliable informants 
of cases where people were expelled from the land for disobeying the chiefs orders. 
During fieldwork I personally encountered three people who were fined for 
disobeying the chiefs orders. The politicians also make use of modern leadership 
such as the village chairman to call meetings. In return for mobilising people, the 
' / politicians accord high places to local leaders at these meetings. Secondly, local 
\\ leaders get prime attention and service at these meetings, and this includes food 
and beer. Such preferential treatment supports their status in the district, and 
generally explains why they readily mobilise people to attend meetings at which 
issues relating to land are discussed.
^Sometimes these big men make use of the newspapers and the radio to spread 
/ messages about the land. Through the media they tell the people where to go if 
J they require settlement. How they get newsmen and reporters to cover messages 
is difficult to say. In the run up to the 1995 parliamentary elections, there were 
numerous televised claims of ’vote-seeking1 politicians paying small fees to 
journalists who agreed to report on, or broadcast, their political campaigns. It is 
possible that politicians in this study area use such practices to ensure that as many 
> people as possible get the message of land availability in Binga. Although there are 
V  a few people who say that they personally read accounts of politicians urging them 
vto migrate into Binga, the majority of immigrants claimed that they heard of this from 
■others who had radios.
The members of parliament are careful in the way that they use radio and 
newspapers to tell people where to settle. They are aware that certain lobby groups 
and. opposition political parties would protest against such messages. Thus they 
rationalise their points by saying that immigrants who have a long history and 
experience in agriculture and animal husbandry would impart their skills to their 
Tonga counterparts upon settlement. They say that it is the national duty of 
immigrants to teach those who were neglected by colonial government. Politicians 
also say that once immigrants get land in Binga, they would boost agricultural 
exports from Zimbabwe. This would make the country the breadbasket of the 
region. Exports from Zimbabwe would ’glorify the name of the country’, and many 
nations would hear about this. . Thus politicians tactfully present immigration as a 
phenomenon that is in line with national goals of self-sufficiency and national 
identity.
In other instances, politicians claim that Ndebele immigration into Binga brings 
ethnic groups together, thus fostering genuine unity. At a meeting I attended early
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in 1995, a senior party official alleged that immigration into Binga would result in the 
Tonga and the Ndebele living side by side, in unity. The official added that living 
together pleased .the fallep heroes who died for that ideal, jrv^sense,im m igra tion- 
is presented as a useful ideological tool in nation building'.'
Such discourse legitimises the activities of the politicians. It makes protest appear 
to oppose national interest (see Kriger, 1995: 139-140). Two examples will help 
illustrate the point. When the district council resolved in 1994 to evict the 
immigrants in the interest of conserving the environment, the party chairman based 
in Lupane township, together with the provincial administrator, condemned the move 
as pursuing tribalistic policies. Such policies, it was said, did not fit in with the 
declared party ideology of nation building. For fear of further victimisation the 
council stopped its plan (Sunday News, 1994: 3).
The second example, which I followed during fieldwork, relates to a safari operator 
who was accused by the governor as well as the party chairman of trying to 
introduce colonialism when he insisted that the Ndebele immigrants were settling in 
Safari hunting areas, thus jeopardising his and council's income base. The governor 
alleged that the white safari operator did not want tribes to live together. In addition, 
the safari operator was accused of having a hidden agenda of wanting to re­
colonise the rural areas with a view to placing his own animals. The political 
discourse employed in these two examples made it impossible for Binga Rural 
Council to proceed with its plans without itself loosing credibility with the outside 
world.
Fields in the Forests: Immigrants' Impact on CAMPFIRE
It has been argued by Rihoy (1992: 16)) that settlement in the forests drives away 
the animals, which are the basis of CAMPFIRE. In this section, I examine the 
impact on CAMPFIRE of the preparation of fields by immigrants. Once settled, 
immigrants start to clear large fields. The trees are burnt down. Sometimes 
immigrants employ Tonga people to uproot trees so that ploughing becomes easier. 
Immigrants share the belief that a good farmer is one who leaves no tree standing in 
his field. They also share the belief that land must be cleared because the ancestral 
spirits and God intend it to be so. Some immigrants clear more land than they 
intend immediately to use ir f  order to establish control over it for future use. 
According to immigrants,|fariy .land-seeker who sees cleared land knows that it 
belongs to somebody. This results in vast expanses of land being shorn of trees but 
not put under cultivation.
Unlike the Tonga people who are.mainly subsistence farmers, the immigrants clear 
fields, putting them under cash crops such as maize, sunflower and cotton. 
Frequently the fields $re enlarged after initial settlement, and this is done by 
encroaching into unoccupied land. The immigrants also introduce cattle and 
donkeys to take advantage of the abundant free pasture (Reynolds, 1991: xxii; 
Murombedzi, 1991). The immigrants, unlike the Tonga people, keep cattle mainly 
for commercial purposes (Madzudzo and Dzingirai, 1995: 36). The introduction of 
cattle and donkeys adds competition for pastures, prompting fears that the fragile 
ecosystem of the valley may be destroyed (Rihoy, 1992: 16). Rihoy has shown that
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the competition for natural resources has led wildlife to retreat to the ecologically 
stressed Chizarira National Park.
It has been argued by Tylor (1991) that immigrants also threaten CAMPFIRE 
through their killing of wildlife. His point applies well to Binga, where immigrants 
openly kill wildlife, which they allege to be destroying their crops. In 1993, 
immigrants openly killed two elephants worth $32 000 each. In 1994 immigrants 
shot down four elephants in one locality. Immigrants also trap small game such as 
impala, bushbuck, buffalo, hare and bush pigs. Immigrants say that they kill only 
those animals that enter fields and damage their crops. In practice, they kill any 
animals that-they come across. Many of the smaller animals are killed in the dry 
season, when there are no crops in the fields. At the time of research, immigrants 
selling meat frequently visited my campsite throughout the year.
The major reason immigrants cite for killing wildlife is that animals destroy crops, 
property and in some cases human life. In a sense this argument is quite tenable: 
immigrants, unlike Tonga people, do not get protection from wildlife. The safari 
operator, who in the framework of CAMPFIRE protects villagers from wildlife, does 
not want to extend his services to immigrants, whom he claims are not interested in 
CAMPFIRE. It is against this background that immigrants shoot and kill wildlife. 
However, some of the targeted animals are not a threat to crops. These include the 
hare, the impala, the buffalo and bushbuck. When pressed as to why they kill small 
and 'innocent' animals, some say they kill smaller animals because these form a 
league with the big animals which create havoc in the area. One immigrant farmer 
remarked that “the smaller animals must die for the sins of their menacing kin”.
Immigrants who kill wild animals share the meat with others or sell it. Almost always 
there is great joy among the immigrants when an animal, particularly an elephant, 
dies. Some people sing and dance round the carcass while others sit on it before 
finally skinning it. I would agree with Hasler (1994: 261) that elephant death seems 
to symbolize the triumph of man over nature's powerful and antagonising forces.
One of the four elephants that were killed was shot several times in the leg and at 
the back. Another was shot in the belly and legs. When immigrants fire at 
elephants, the aim is not just to kill but to induce death through pain. Indeed many 
people say that the shooting of legs is meant to convey to other remaining animals 
the dangers of interfering with immigrant property. As one immigrant farmer who 
mortally wounded an elephant said:
” Wounding elephants will make them come to have a glimpse of the 
pain they inflict on the people through damaging their property. The 
lucky elephants which see one of their members leaping because of 
pain say to themselves it is not safe to eat crops belonging to 
immigrants. ”
The practice of killing wildlife threatens the district’s environmental initiative and 
deprives the district of valuable revenue to use in household and collective 
development. Without any tangible benefits, Council claims it is not possible to 
convince locals to conserve wildlife. Secondly, the killings also deprive the Tonga of 
meat. The Council claims, that since CAMPFIRE started it has never been able to
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harvest wildlife for the purposes of providing people with meat. Each year it has 
been forced to defer its intended cropping to a date in the future when .there would 
be surplus wildlife. Whether rightly or wrongly, the Council blames this failure on 
immigrants.
Today the Tonga people are losing heart in CAMPFIRE and some frequently 
abscond from meetings (Madzudzo and Dzingirai, 1995). CAMPFIRE requires all 
people who receive benefits from wildlife to refrain from poaching, a point that 
Tonga people generally accepted in the early years of CAMPFIRE. Quite naturally, 
the Tonga now say that it makes very little sense to stop killing wildlife when 
immigrants do so rampantly. As one village leader lamented, 'These immigrants kill 
buffaloes, selecting the young ones for meat. Every day they eat toasted liver. We 
the Tonga people do not do that.' What is further insulting to the Tonga people is 
that these immigrants are not arrested and put in jail.
Immigrants often find that killing selected species is not sufficient to solve problems 
caused by wildlife. Elephants from the overpopulated national parks and safari 
areas frequently make return trips for immigrants' maize crops. As an additional 
solution the immigrants start big fires which they let burn through the forest. During 
fieldwork I frequently came across these fires intended to drive animals away from 
the area. Another solution adopted by immigrants is to recruit new people from their 
area of origin, to whom they allocate land in the wilderness. Immigrants believe that 
wildlife do not like to see dense populations of humans. Some say that the sight of 
many people scares wildlife and that this causes them to retire into those areas that 
are without big numbers of humans. Apart from destroying the vegetation and the 
forests upon which wildlife depends, these practices occasionally interfere with the 
safari operation in the district as the evidence below suggests.
Immigrants and Safari Operations
It is frequently the case that safari operators choose 'wild and uninhabited' areas for 
their hunting operations (MED, 1994: 16). When the safari operator chose to 
operate in Binga he was, like all safari hunters, attracted by its uninhabited forests 
and abundant wildlife. For the safari operator, Binga offered the overseas clients an 
opportunity to experience the 'wild and natural', something that no longer exists in 
the domesticated landscapes of most parts of the developed world. Good business 
for safari hunting would result in cash benefits for the district and this is the reason 
why Council promised to create a 'good' hunting environment. In particular, the 
district would prohibit human settlement in safari hunting areas.
Immigration and the subsequent settlement of people in wildlife areas angered the 
safari operator who feared that his clients would no longer enjoy their hunts. At one 
stage he tried to deal with immigrants directly, serving them with notices of eviction 
from the concession area. Locals allege that he burnt immigrants' huts. The 
immigrants approached the politicians for support - first the Provincial Administrator 
and later the Governor. When told that the operator had issued evictionjorders and 
had ^already; started to burn homes belonging to those settled in the concession 
area, both big men were incensed. In their view the safari operator was racist 
because he wanted to take land away from Africans. They pointed out that in a free
7
Zimbabwe, Whites have no right to remove people from their land. The two men 
-not only promised that the immigrants would not be evicted; they also promised to 
'discipline the recalcitrant White man'.
Having acquired the support of the big men, the immigrants went back to their 
homes. After some days, they were told by the safari operator and his men to 
vacate the land. When the safari operator threatened to use force, the immigrants 
went on a rampage. They destroyed the safari operator's camp located near their 
settlement and property worth half a million dollars. When Council sent its owri 
scouts, accompanied by a policemen, to identify and round up the culprits, these too 
were grabbed and beaten, because people said they were conspiring with the White 
man who wanted to take away their promised land. After these events, the council 
kept silent on the issue of immigrants. The safari operator accused the council of 
doing nothing against immigrants. For breach of contract the safari operator asked 
for $5,000,000 (five million Zimbabwe dollars) from the Council as compensation. 
Because the council had no money it gave him another area in another part of the 
district to hunt, free of charge for the next five years.
Summary and Conclusion
In this study area, the politicians' need for land is a common feature. The politicians 
in the countryside need land to give the immigrants in exchange for their political 
support. In addition they give land for ethnic reasons: as representatives of their 
ethnic group, they feel obliged to provide for the needs of their fellow men.
The CAMPFIRE programme entails setting aside land for safari hunting. Without 
doing so, the programme would not be able to generate revenue and other benefits 
to use as an incentive to stop the poaching of wildlife. CAMPFIRE'S need for land, 
then, runs counter to the needs of the politicians. Consequently, politicians have 
opposed CAMPFIRE, or at least tried to control it.
The data from this case study confirms the point made by Mararike (1993: 31) .that 
politicians generally tend to oppose those development projects that undercut, or 
threaten to undercut, their political base. For rural development projects to survive, 
they must serve the interests of powerful politicians.
Projects based on communities' management o f resources, such as CAMPFIRE, 
aim not just to develop rural people, but also to conserve natural resources. The 
material from this study shows that when such projects threaten the interests of 
politicians in the countryside, they are not likely to succeed in achieving their goals.
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